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To do philosophy is to explore one's own temperament, and yet at the same 
time to attempt to discover the truth. 
-Iris Murdoch 
Voluntary acts of compassion and acts of community are always needed, in 
all societies, and always will be. 
-Robert L. Payton 
I N THIS BOOK~ expl~re some of the.ways philanthropy contribut:s to morally desirable relattonshtps when we gtve w1th care-w1th good wtll and good 
judgment, with responsible moral concern. 1 In doing so I discuss a variety 
of moral issues: the role of the virtues in philanthropy, responsibilities to 
help others, distortions in helping, mixed motives in giving, and how voluntary 
service contributes to self-fulfillment. 
After providing an overview of the philosophy of philanthropy, Chapter 
I develops a definition of philanthropy as voluntary private giving for public 
purposes. This definition is value-neutral and draws together the enormous 
variety of voluntary service for study without normative blinkers. It avoids 
assumptions about whether philanthropy has good motives, aims, or results, 
and it leaves open the question of whether philanthropy can be a moral re-
sponsibility. Sometimes philanthropy has a bad name; more often it has no 
name at all or else the emotionally clouded name of "charity." While it is less 
commonly used in everyday discourse than it was in the nineteenth century, 
the word "philanthropy'' is currently undergoing a rebirth as a general term 
referring to both volunteering and monetary giving, whether for humanitar-
ian or cultural purposes. "Voluntary service" is a good two-word equivalent, 
and I use it as a synonym, mindful that service comes in the form of money 
as well as time. 
Chapter I also develops a framework for connecting desirable forms of 
philanthropy with the virtues. Most philanthropic giving occurs as participa-
tion in social practices, such as donating blood, contributing to public televi-
sion, sheltering the homeless, paying tithing, and volunteering in museums 
or hospitals. These are practices in the colloquial sense: patterns of conduct 
engaged in by many people and continuing over time. They are also practices 
in Alasdair Macintyre's technical sense: complex cooperative human endeav-
ors which, when pursued virtuously, promote the good of individuals and 
X Preface 
communities. Philanthropy makes possible a variety of benefits to recipients 
and benefactors, especially the caring relationships it fosters. 
Philanthropy is not itself a virtue; it is an activity which may be good or 
bad. Nor are any virtues unique to philanthropy. Instead, all major virtues 
play a role in philanthropic giving: obviously generosity and compassion, but 
also courage and conscientiousness, faith and fairness, gratitude and good 
judgment, honesty and humility, integrity and inspiration, love and loyalty, 
pride and perseverence, responsible authority and respect for others, self-
knowledge and self-respect, wisdom and moral creativity. Chapter 2 discusses 
some thirty virtues relevant to philanthropy, sorting them into two general 
categories: participation virtues, which are especially important in motivating 
philanthropy, and enabling virtues, which tend to make philanthropy effec-
tive. Elucidating these virtues with examples helps sharpen our moral under-
standing of philanthropy and philanthropists. 
Much philanthropy is morally optional-desirable or at least permissible, 
but not obligatory. In certain contexts there are also responsibilities to en-
gage in philanthropy, as I argue in Chapter 3. Some of them derive from the 
obligation of mutual aid in assisting people in life-threatening situations. 
Others derive from the obligation of reciprocity to do our fair share in com-
munities and practices from which we benefit. These two general obligations 
apply to everyone, though their precise requirements vary greatly according 
to circumstances. I also set forth a conception of "supererogatory responsibil-
ities" -obligations transcending the call of duty incumbent on everyone, and 
whose origin lies in highly personal commitments to optional moral ideals. 
The responsibilities of professionals to engage in pro bono publico work (offer-
ing services at reduced or no fee) are often supererogatory but sometimes a 
professional requirement. All philanthropic responsibilities, both general and 
supererogatory ones, leave considerable room for discretion in deciding how 
to meet them. Whether optional or obligatory, philanthropy is primarily a 
forum for personal moral expression. 
Philanthropy goes awry for many reasons besides bad luck. Attempts to 
help are self-defeating when they are based upon naivete, stupidity, lack of 
imagination, insensitivity, arrogance, or any number of other character flaws. 
An especially egregious fault, one recurringly inveighed against in the history 
of philanthropy, is the failure to respect individual autonomy, that is, the 
right and the ability to competently pursue one's interests and values. In 
Chapter 4- I discuss several instances involving degrading attitudes toward 
recipients, abuses in fundraising, exploitation of volunteers, and harm to 
third parties. In a related vein, I examine circumstances in which incentives 
for volunteering are coercive, an issue that has surfaced in recent debates over 
tying financial aid for college students to volunteering for national service. 
Special attention is devoted to how sexism threatens the autonomy of women 
Preface Xt 
W. th this chapter, I attempt to provide balanced attention to the volunteers. 1 · · h all · · 
· · d orally ambiguous side of phtlanthropy Wit out owmg It to 
uloomy an m . . · 2 
D • h br1'ghter s1de as 1t so eastly does. dtpset e ' · 
e M · for philanthropy interest us because they reveal what a person 1s 
ottves · · · h . 
· 1 mmitted to. Unfortunately, we are eager to cntKtze t e motives 
crenmne y co . lf . 
D h'l h opists (other than ourselves). The first whtff of se -mterest 
of p 1 ant r . . . . . c. h •~ harges of hypocrisy. Indeed, cymosm about philanthropy 1s a 1as -
eVOl'.eS C . . al" . c. al 1 
. . bl · of sophistication, as well as a ration 1zation 10r mor comp a-
Iona e sign . " h' h b" I Chapter 5 I argue that "mixed motl ves, w 1c com me 
cency. n · al · h"l h h 1 · 
lf rn With altruism are as typiC m p 1 ant ropy as anyw ere e se m se -conce ' . . . 
life. Philanthropy can be highl~ admtrable w1tho~t be1?g pu~ely selfies~, and 
· d otives can even be des1rable when they mtens1fy phllanthrophK en-
m1xe m . · · h 1 · al 
d A Challenge to this tolerance of mtxed motives IS psyc o ogK ego-eavors. 
· the view that we are all exclusively self-seeking. Formulated by Thomas 
:bbes in the seventeenth century, this out~ook on human life has been 
endorsed by many social scientists, not to mentton authors of self-help books. 
I · almost unanimously rejected by philosophers, and I present the reasons t IS · all 
h I also comment on cynicism, the view that our motives are gener y w y. . 'al' h 
selfish or unsavory in other ways. And I argue agamst consequent1 1sm, t e 
view that only results are morally important, not motives. 
Philanthropy breeds paradoxes, several of which are discuss~d in. ~hapter 
6. Thus it is said that selflessness promotes self-fulfillment; In g1vmg we 
receive· 'we find ourselves by losing ourselves (in service to others); self-sur-
render '(to good causes) is liberating; the way to ge~ h~ppiness is t? forget it 
(while promoting the happiness of other people); fatt.h 1s ~elf-~ulfillmg. The.se 
conundrums are easily abused when they become rattonal1zat1o~s for expl~It­
ing people on behalf of immoral causes. Yet. th~~ also conv~y Important m-
sights as they apply to morally concerned mdiv1duals. Phllanthro~y offers 
numerous avenues for self-fulfilling service, at least when a match ts found 
between personal interests and philanthropic opportunities, and even though 
altruism takes many other directions as well. 
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Giving with Care 
The epithets sociable, goo~-natured, humane, n:erciful, grateful, friendly~ generous, 
beneficent, or their eqmvalents, are known m all languages, and umversally 
express the highest merit, which human nature is capable of attaining. 
-David Hume 
When I give I give myself. 
-Walt Whitman 
"tX TE ARE ALL philanthrorists on so~e occasi~ns. Each of us has con-
. V V tributed beyond our ctrde of family and fnends and work. We have 
donated money, time, talent, energy, blood, or clothing. We have volunteered 
1:o help a community, church, political organization, social cause, sports team, 
or scout troop. Put simply, philanthropy is voluntary giving for public ends. 
More fully, philanthropy is voluntary private (nongovernment) giving for 
public purposes, whether gifts are large or small, money or time, local or 
international in scope, for purposes which are humanitarian, cultural, reli-
gious, civic, environmental, or of mutual aid. 1 
At its best, philanthropy unites individuals in caring relationships that 
enrich giver and receiver alike. Often it is heroic and inspiring: witness the 
lives of Moses, Jesus, Muhammad, Susan B. Anthony, Jane Addams, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and Mother Teresa of Calcutta. But philanthropy can also 
be harmful. 2 At its worst, it is divisive and demeaning to everyone involved, 
as in contributing to hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. Too often phi-
lanthropy squanders precious resources on misguided groups such as those 
promoting astrology and those more concerned with self-seeking than with 
~elping others. In between the clearly good and the obviously bad, much 
philanthropy is morally ambiguous, combining good intentions with bad re-
sults, or bad intentions with good results, or good and bad motives with 
good and bad consequences. 
Philanthropy, then, is morally complex, in theory as well as in practice. 
While luck plays a role, much turns on whether we give with care-with 
and carefulness, with good will and good judgment. 
2 Virtuous Giving 
Philosophy of Philanthropy 
. Philanthropy raise~ importa?t moral issues in at least four main areas. ( 
Soctal and poht1cal philosophy 1s concerned with the overall impact of 
lanthropy on society, as well as with the role of government in rPn•nl~ ... ; __ .. 
and supporting it, for example with tax deductions for gifts to charities. 
Professional ethics studies the responsibilities of development officers ( 
raisers), foundation officials, and other professionals involved in phu· ant:hr<)pi1~·•·• 
organizations. (3) The ethics of recipients deals with the responsibilities 
beneficiaries, such as honesty in writing grant proposals, fidelity to .nr-..-.~-.-'· 
intentions, and avoiding harmful forms of dependency (pauperism). (4) The 
ethics of philanthropic giving focuses on the ideals, virtues, and responsibil-
ities of philanthropists. 
In this book I focus on the ethics of philanthropic giving, only occa-
sionally touching on the other areas. The topics discussed concern each 
us as (actual or potential) donors and volunteers. Foundation and cor 
tion philanthropy will be mentioned only as they bear on giving by indivi• 
duals. 
When ethicists have discussed philanthropy, typically under the name 
charity, it has usually been in connection with particular topics such as giv-
ing to alleviate world hunger and volunteering to promote environmental 
causes. Yet some issues require more systematic reflection. When and why · 
philanthropy valuable? How does it contribute to meaningful life? What does 
it have to do with being a good person? In which ways does it promote 
desirable communities? What should be our priorities in choosing which of 
the innumerable good causes to support with our limited resources? 
In addition to these general questions, or rather as my way of approach-
ing them, I will ask six more focused questions, one in each of the chapters. 
(I) How should philanthropy be defined and understood for the purposes 
moral inquiry? (2) Which virtues guide giving? (3) Are there any responsi-
bilities to engage in philanthropy, and if so, how much should we give and 
to whom? ( 4) When is philanthropy morally damaging, and what does it 
mean for gifts to be coerced or coercive? (5) Should philanthropy be moti-
vated by pure altruism, that is, unselfish concern for others, or is it all right 
for self-interest to be mixed with altruism? (6) How should we understand 
the paradox that selflessness contributes to self-fulfillment? 
These are large topics. They can be approached from many perspectives 
and with the tools of many disciplines. While my research has been interdis-
ciplinary, my framework is philosophical. I hope to show how philosophical 
ethics increases our moral understanding of philanthropy and to encourage 
others to do further work in this area. 
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:>.F~thllCIS1rs (moral philosophers, philosophers o~ mo~alit!) have. neglecte~ 1ilintl1fOPY~ largely relinquishing the toptc to soc1al sctenttsts. Philosophers 
tltribtttt<>ns have tended to be written for technical journals which are in-
a wider audience, including a collection of essays which, remark-
th:o only contemporary philosophical book on philanthropy. 3 Apart 
that collection, most philosophical essays h~ve. been narrowly focused 
s ecial topics as world hunger, thereby m1ss1ng the benefits of more ·.;>····~~tenlaiJLcp approaches. (Is it obvious, ~ithout a~gu~e~t, that world hunger 
have priority over all other philanthropiC . g1vmg?) Others are . pre-
.. ,:1ttJtvw• ... in the midst of developing an abstract ethtcal theory, more as lllus-
tr<lltl<JUS than with an eye to practical implications. 
This is a work in applied ethics, in three respects. First, the focus is on 
topics arising in a particular area of our liv~s, rather than on ~eneral 
in ethical theory. The topics are at once pubhc and personal, dehghtful 
·· ·· ..... ..,.-- important and intriguing. They deserve to become an area 
specialization in philosophy, alo~gside med_ical ethics, business ethics, ~n­
tr:jnec:nlltg ethics, environmental eth1cs, and philosophy of women, to mentiOn 
a few areas of applied philosophy which have emerged in recent decades. 
Second, this book is a philosophical response to practical moral needs. 
than dwelling on abstruse intellectual puzzles, the book is rooted in 
J>tactJlCal interests. Nevertheless, those interests lead naturally into intellectu-
all'r cJlalllen:~mtg tasks: to clarify the moral concepts used as tools in making 
philrultblrO]ptc decisions, to explore philanthropy's contribution to community 
a.nd character, and to develop a unifying perspective on philanthropic values. 
Third, because I am convinced that the lifeblood of philosophy is its 
c.eontribution to public discourse, 4 I have written for a wide audience of stu-
interdisciplinary scholars, social activists, and concerned citizens, as 
as for professional philosophers. I have also tried to heed Moliere's coun-
"humanize your talk, and speak to be understood. "5 
My approach is applied, then, in terms of focus, relevance, and audience. 
not, however, applied in the sense of embracing a general theory about 
tound~ltto'n of moral values and applying it to philanthropy (or other 
The three theories which have been most influential in recent cen-
have attempted to state the foundational principles of right (and 
action. Thus, according to Immanuel Kant's duty-ethics, right acts 
required by a set of duties which would be embraced by fully ra-
moral agents. According to John Locke's rights-ethics, right acts are 
which respect human rights. And according to utilitarians such as Je-
Bentham and John Stuart Mill, right acts are those which produce the 
good for the most people, or which fall under rules producing the most 
··· · ··"··· · ··· ~-~--.-- .. good. 
Why not select one of these theories and simply apply it to philanthropy? 
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For one thing, it is not dear which theory to select. All the theories 
in different versions, and all of them are highly controversial. Defending 
one of them would immerse us in theoretical disputes, effectively susl>endin 
applied inquiry. For another thing, these theories focus on rules about 
and wrong action; they devote little attention to questions about higher 
als of character and community which are crucial in thinking about 
thropy. 
Most important, we should be more impressed by the similarities 
by the differences among the three theories. 6 Each theory is an 
framework which can be filled out in many directions. Each emerged as 
attempt to provide a clear and comprehensive overview of morality, 
hence each must remain in line with our most carefully considered 
convictions. Since defenders of all the theories struggle to make those 
ments, it matters relatively little whether the final appeal is to duties or 
or overall good. What matters is how principles of duties are formulated 
weighed, how rights are understood, and how good consequences are 
sured and tallied. To be sure, there are fundamental disagreements 
reasonable people, even in the moral judgments they are most certain 
Those differences, however, are reflected in different versions of each type 
ethical theory, as well as in disputes over which type is preferable. 
Accordingly, I draw freely upon ideas from all the theories, ackno,MedP'~ 
ing that the ideas will be developed in different ways within different 
oretical frameworks. For example, I draw upon the concept of r · 
knowing that rights-ethicists will take them as morally fundamental, 
ethicists will derive them from duties, and utilitarians will construe them 
benefits and liberties whose recognition produces the most good for the 
people. I also rely on principles that virtually all the theories endorse: 
example, that we should do our fair share when we benefit from coc:>pt:rat:tVe 
practices, and that we should help people whose lives are endangered 
we can do so at little risk to ourselves. 
One other ethical theory, virtue-ethics, will play a more prominent 
Virtue-ethics emphasizes good and bad character more than principles 
right and wrong conduct. This ancient theory, which has attracted rentewea 
interest during the past decade, has sometimes been viewed as an .................... "~"' 
to theories about right and wrong conduct. That is a mistake. Good .... u ........... L-·. 
and right conduct are complementary ideas, not competing ones. 
quate ethical theory will integrate them rather than attempt to derive 
from the other. Hence I am not claiming that virtue-ethics is a sufficient 
theory of morality, or that virtues are more theoretically fundamental 
right action. 7 As an applied ethicist, my interest is in exploring specific vir-
tues and other aspects of character which contribute to understanding phi,; 
lanthropy. I explore good character in all its dimensions: responsible '-v••'"'"''""L'· 
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central thesis, or rather theme, is that virtuous philanthropy fosters 
~?'~ <r ~Yilluable caring relationships. As a result, philanthr?p~ i~ a vital dimension. of 
., ...• /. m.n .. T good lives. Not all good lives, h~weve~, for l?divlduals may _emphastze 
•.•. • .. · .. •••"t-::L'"""~- avenues for caring, such as famlly, fnendsh1p, and professions. I am 
claiming that philanthropy is the primary mark of all caring people, but 
that virtuous philanthropy adds meaning to the lives of morally con-
•·c·•··•··''''"""'' ..... , .. .-~ individuals. Philosophical inquiry should help make that contribution 
begins in wonder (Aristotle) and love (Plato), develops by 
<><•.¢Qrttr<>ntmg perplexity (Wittgenstein), and culminates by enhancing mean-
.(,;;>Jp.gf1Il life (Socrates). To study ethics is to scrutinize our own moral values, 
.·~·1rtp~hil:anthr<>PV as elsewhere. Such is the heritage of Socrates, that remarkable 
iilanthtrOIJist who engaged in philosophy as a voluntary service to his com-
as well as a search for self-understanding. 
'" '" .... · .. 1-'hllO:sot>hv integrates personal vision and public argument. Like science, 
..~'c''"'''··"" ~"''"'.....,., truth; like art, it seeks to convey an individual perspective which 
·"~ ., ............ , ... wu contact with interpersonal values. As Wittgenstein aptly suggested, 
''.\t?tulosOl>hv is much like architecture. 8 In both disciplines, structures stand or 
.tall. J:>1ecause of realities independent of us. In both, much of the work is done 
,:y"l'·""ll\...~1;;11~ on one's interpretation of the world, on one's way of seeing and 
overall tone of this book is positive. In part that is because my 
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primary interest is in how philanthropy contributes to valuable caring 
tionships. In part it reflects my conviction that philanthropy evokes 
our noblest impulses and does far more good than bad. Nevertheless, 
rather because of this positive tone, three caveats are necessary. 
First, my faith that philanthropy does far more good than bad is 
that-a faith. Defending it would require a different kind of book.9 In 
book the focus is on the practical moral interests of individual givers. 
fending claims about the overall effects of philanthropy would require a 
that moved away from personal ethics and toward social and political 
sophy centered on nonprofit organizations, foundations, governments, 
the cumulative impact of philanthropy on society. For the purposes of 
book, what matters is that much good is done through philanthropy, and 
is not so much a faith as it is common knowledge. 
The social-political approach would ask, for example: Are social 
best provided by the federal government, state governments, nonprofit 
nizations, or some combination thereof? Should the arts and humanities 
heavily subsidized by tax revenues or left to philanthropic patronage? To 
extent should government regulate the activities of philanthropic nrn ............ ~ 
tions? Which gifts ought to be tax deductible? How should pnJtiarlthJ:'OPl 
organizations be structured and managed? Do predominant patterns of 
lanthropy in the United States benefit the rich more than the poor, 
more than women, the arts more than malnourished children? My 
virtuous giving complements, but cannot replace, inquiry into these 
tions. 
Second, I am not writing as an apologist for the Nonprofit Sector. It 
become fashionable, if not altogether illuminating, to divide the 
economy into three sectors: business (for-profit companies), government, 
nonprofits (not-for-profit organizations). The Nonprofit Sector is so · 
that general perceptions of it are much like responses to Rorschach tests: 
reveal more about the perceiver than what is perceived. Virtue and vice, 
well as altruistic service and corruption, are manifested in all ec<Jm>mJ 
areas-government, business, the professions, family, and philanthropy. 
much that I say implies the vital significance of a vigorous Nonprofit 
Third, and most important, I am not endorsing a political ideology 
favors private philanthropy as a replacement for government welfare 
grams. Government bears the primary responsibility for meeting the 
needs of disadvantaged citizens by fairly distributing welfare costs 
taxation. 10 There are four reasons for this. 
(1) Scale. Homelessness, violence, and poverty (especially of ..... u.~.~ ... ~ ... 
have increased dramatically during the past decade. During the same 
welfare services have been cut back. Support for disadvantaged people is 
delivered through a partnership among government, nonprofit or~~an1'2 ~anons 
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but primary responsibility for funding for the desper-~e.rnabet·k,etf,Iaceto' government with its authority to tax and regulate. As 
:.~ongs . . " h'l h . [ .c. ] 
K. Jr. remarked wtth prescience, p 1 ant ropy 1s 01 ten tng,' · · 1 kh · 
b t · t must not cause the philanthropist to over oo t e clr-u 1 . . 1- h'l h ,11 
of economic injustice whtch ma~e p 1 an~ r?PY necessary. 
· Human capacities for altrmsm are hmtted, and hence vol-Securtty. . h · · · f hilanthropy cannot be rehed upon as t e mat?stay m meetmg un-
P d Government welfare programs provide assurances to the 
nee s. . · · 1 
· bless that their minimal needs wdl be met. In an mcreastng y JO . 
. world, each of us needs that secunty. . . . . . 
Fairness. Government provides a mechanism for . fairly distnhbut~ng 
i.bttrac:::ns on taxpayers and benefits for recipients. While that mec antsm 
.t·~llwa·vs used properly, nevertheless it tends to be more reliable than the 
fforts of philanthropic organizations, even when those efforts be-
e (as they usually are not). Concentrating on the weaknesses 
1vel~nrne11t and the moral limitations of a competitive marketplace should 
in the hyperbole of calling philanthropy "the moral sector."12 
Symbolism. Government prog~ams express t,?e collec~ive ca~i?g of an 
society, symbolically as well.as m substance .. An_ o~fictal pohtiCal c?n-
issues or problems," wntes Robert Noztck, 1s a way of markmg 
ir}i
1
mnort:am:e or urgency, and hence of expressing, intensifying, channel-
encouraging, and validating our private actions and concerns toward 
'?13. Government programs are essential to establish the "solemn mark-
our human solidarity'' within caring communities. 
course, philanthropy also carries symbolic meanings, as I will_em~ha­
··· '""'·"L often, however, its symbolism does not express the offiCial v1ew 
-..... ~~···-.. society. That is both a limit and a strength. Philanthropy enables 
<t,,, ............ and groups to express their values, substantively and symbolically, 
first having to persuade the majority in a democracy. That frees phi-
to function as a catalyst for change. It makes possible focused and 
responses to social problems and community aspirations, sometimes 
r¢f<::>tnung government. Above all, it contributes to caring relationships 
1<¢1Dmmutm1:tes in more personal ways than by voting and paying taxes. 
Scope of Philanthropy 
children, my friends and I gave to the March of Dimes thro}lgh our 
troup. We saved dimes in cardboard holders and then mailed them in 
We also sponsored fundraisers, staffed carnival booths, and served 
•mlnumt:v dinners. Helping was a simple gesture, at once a natural impulse, 
and a group endeavor. It was clear to us there were other avenues 
net·ptng. Family and friends supported victims of polio in a more exten-
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si:e and in~imate. way, an~ scientists such as Jonas Salk helped through 
attve. w?rk 1.n their pro~e~s.tons. 14 I do not remember, however, using a 
to disttngmsh our acttVItles from these other forms of service; we 
lumped them all together under the heading of helping out or doing 
share. Today the best single term is "philanthropy"; the best two-word 
pression is "voluntary service." I use them interchangeably, with some 
erence for the brevity of the former, to refer to all forms of voluntary 
giving for public purposes. 
Alternative terms are misleading for one reason or another. Thus 
word "humanitarianism" is either too broad in covering all kinds of " 
including work in the professions, or too narrow in referring to the 
tion of suffering but not to cultural patronage. "Charity'' may be 
by some people, but its meaning has become diffused into three spe:ctaJlt~ 
m~ani~gs: Christian love (in its honorific sense), condescending pity ( · 
peJorative sense), and the tax-deductible status of organizations (in its 
sense). "Volunt~rism" .and "volunteerism" suggest a particular ideology 
how to deal wtth soctal problems, namely, through voluntary service 
than by government involvement. 
The definition of philanthropy is somewhat vague. Each of its four 
terc~nnected elements needs to be clarified: voluntary, private, giving, 
pubhc purposes. It would be futile, however, to seek an absolutely 
definition. "Philanthropy'' refers to many kinds of giving which are 
related by overlapping similarities. 15 The following remarks are ·u· tter1de1d' 
s~g?posts which roughly indicate the ground to be explored without 
ngtd ~onceptual boundaries. Or rather, the remarks identify the features 
paradigm (dear-cut) cases while also indicating areas of vagueness which 
my purposes need not be removed. 
(I) Philanthropy is voluntary in the sense of being intended and 
~reed. "~ntended" means the act or activity is done with the purpose of 
tng a gtft. "Uncoerced" rules out legal penalties for not giving, as well 
threats of harm and other morally objectionable forms of force, mant·l m1:1t1o 
and deception. Extortion, not philanthropy, occurs when a donation is 
?ecause o~ a threat of penalties, and abusive force is present when a 
Is constramed to make a political contribution in order to keep a job. 
. V~luntarin~s.s implies both the absence of coercion and the presence 
mtentt~nal acttvtty. When one of these elements is missing, nonstandard 
borderline (doubtful) cases arise. Suppose I am deceived or otherwise 
into giving money for a purpose I disapprove of. Perhaps a "charity 
teer'' cons me into believing I am giving in order to help build a shelter 
homeless ~eopl~ and then uses my money to support his lavish lifestyle. 
I engage 1n philanthropy? Yes and no. Yes: I acted intentionally for 
thought was a public purpose, even though my intention was subverted. 
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was manipulated and coerced, even though I attempted to engage 
. Whatever we decide to say about such cases, they are not 
hat would be used in explaining what philanthropy is. 
t is not a synonym for "willingly," in the sense of acting as 
r wishes to. Loyal citizens concerned with the public good might ~xes willingly, without feeling pressured to give. Nevertheless, 
not a form of voluntary service. The failure to pay them carries a 
and hence there is force present, even if some individuals do 
for~ed. Conversely, some philanthropy is done reluctantly, rather 
.,<JII1nc:l'tv Individuals might voluntarily contribute to Amnesty Interna-
·'M•-->t-1'r~te·o by a stern sense of duty, all the time wishing they could 
money in more self-indulgent ways. Perhaps the reluctance indi-
absence of perfect virtue, but it does not make the giving involun-
"voluntary'' does not mean morally optional or nonoblig-
is important. Our definition allows that some philanthropy might 
responsibility, as many people believe it is. I might give volun-
Irttentionally and without coercion, to help people in serious distress, 
believing I have a responsibility to give. My belief, in turn, may be 
depetldlng on the circumstances and on justifiable principles of obliga-
general, issues concerning obligations should be left open for inquiry 
dosed by definitional fiat. 
foblht:an'ne:ss is a matter of degree and interpretation, as is coercion. 
is obvious when criminals are ordered to engage in community 
as the penalty for their crime. A lesser degree of coercion occurs when 
given a choice between community service and spending time in 
should we say, however, about Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North's 
"'>h • ..,. ..... " of community service in working with inner-city youths? The 
was not entirely voluntary, since it was court-ordered as part of the 
for his conviction in the Iran-Contra scandal (a conviction that was 
· o\rertunled). Nevertheless, he approached his service with an enthusias-
"attacking this public service with the energy and tenacity of a born 
He developed innovative ideas, initiating a "Pied Piper Program" 
children away from drugs by taking them to observe cocaine addicts. 
punching a dock, he put in longer hours and far more effort 
required. While his service is not a paradigm of philanthropy, surely 
a philanthropic dimension. 
:~o>rne:tJ.lmt~s we make donations because we are pressured by fundraisers, 
friends, religious leaders, or a climate of social expectation. Are 
pressures coercive, making giving more like extortion than voluntary 
? ·Occasionally, peer pressure can become extreme so as to generate 
of coercion, and pressures within authority relationships easily be-
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come coercive, as with pressures to contribute to an employer's favorite 
However, most social pressures to give are moderate, of the kind 
in human affairs. We are free to resist them without penalty, other 
negative attitudes of others-which we must confront in all areas of 
(2) Private giving contrasts with government spending. P _____ _. ....... v 
give their own money and time, unlike government officials who 
public money. Most philanthropic giving, about 8o percent of it, 
gifts by individuals. The rest comes from nongovernment oq~anliZ<lttions.c 
pecially private foundations, not-for-profit corporations, and for-profit 
nesses. 
In practice, philanthropy and government spending are u· ....... , ...... __ _ 
Many nonprofit philanthropic organizations are funded as much by 
ment funds as by private support. America's welfare programs 
much on nonprofit organizations as on government agencies to 
vices. The extent of this dependence became clear during Ronald 
administration. Reagan praised nonprofit welfare organizations while 
cutting government funding for them. He also reduced tax incenti 
individual gifts to charities. 17 The result was a sharp curtailment of 
serviCes. 
It is tempting to refer to federal humanitarian aid to other ron., ..... , ........ 
"government philanthropy." I will resist the temptation. It is true that 
foreign aid amounts to indirect giving from the citizens of aeJmC)Cr:ilcu~s 
the citizens of other countries. The government serves as a vehicle for 
rying out the humanitarian aims of its citizens, as well as the aims of 
expediency, presumably based on their collective consent to be taxed for 
purposes. Yet much the same can be said of government spending on 
programs for its citizens. Even when voluntary giving and taxation 
the same ends, then, it is worthwhile to distinguish them by rt>~:t"r'LJ1n,o­
term "philanthropy'' for nongovernment giving. 
(3) Giving means donating one's resources without contracting to 
comparable economic compensation. The resources may take the form of 
unteered labor, expertise, money, or items having economic value. Gi 
differs from economic exchanges, such as selling a car, where there is 
explicit contract between two parties who exchange goods or services. 
theless, sometimes philanthropy is engaged in to acquire economic 
as with most corporate philanthropy, which is tied to marketing and 
relations. 
Philanthropists often do seek economic benefits. Volunteers might 
and need advertised benefits, such as the modest living stipend given to 
Corps volunteers. Occasionally they even receive indirect economic 
greater than their contributions, for example, lucrative employment 
nities based on their credentials as volunteers, or business advantages 
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for community involvement. Since ~ want t? leave ope? 
motives, I will allow that self-interest 1s sometimes the pn-
clusive motive for philanthropy. 
ex Hood a philanthropist? Acco~ding to legen~, he libe~ally dis-
to needy people without seekmg compensatton, motivated by 
a sense of justice. 18 Yet the money was stolen, hence not hts 
1 · ·t let us agree that giving means transferring ownership of or can y, . , . d al 19 A property, as well as volunteen~g o?e s ume an t ent. s-
Hood was returning money to tts nghtful owners because the 
ere so excessive as to be immoral, Robin Hood qualifies as a 
w for his voluntary service on behalf of a public cause. Philan-
not occur, however, when one donates to a charity money 
.;rnmu.u.l\..Ht..J. • Presumably that was involved in the charitable gifts of 
f dollars by Michael Milken, the junk-bond financier of corporate 0
during the 19sos who was sent to jail on numerous counts of fraud. 
foundation officers who distribute grants philanthropists? Probably 
· they are paid professionals and assuming they do not own the 
. Yet suppose a particular officer chooses the job over far more 
offers, pursues the work from a desire to help others, ~~d p_uts in 
time and effort than is normally expected? Our defimuon 1s suf-
flexible to acknowledge a philanthropic dimension to this work. 
is also a philanthropic dimension to workers who serve the public 
the compensation of a paycheck. For most jobs we can distinguish 
(a) the required level of performance and (b) an exceptional (opti-
maJdmal) level of performance. 20 When workers perform at exceptional 
order to help others well beyond what they are paid for, their work 
a philanthropic dimension. For example, consider Wally Olson, the 
singing bus driver who leads his passengers in songs, each day 
requests for favorite numbers. 21 He gets to know his regular cus-
and becomes involved with their problems. And he makes it his job 
a cheerful, caring attitude that has helped to personalize an oth-
impersonal and occasionally violent work situation. 
Public purposes comprise virtually all social aims beyond helping one's 
and friends. The aims might be civic: citizens' support for cities, conn-
nations, political candidates and groups, and social movements. 
r"u.ull:,.11L be religious: support for a church, synagogue, mosque, or reli-
Some are cultural: gifts for the arts, humanities, science, 
libraries, or historical monuments. Others are humanitarian: giv-
9 c~m<:rg~enc:v relief efforts, donating blood, contributing to medical re-
volunteering in a center for the disabled, or finding shelter for the 
Still others are environmental: protecting animals, forests, ecosys-
and clean air and water. 
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Philanthropy and friendship overlap in many instances. Is Dflill::tru-t,; •. 
involved when individuals donate to a literary dub or church whose 
are their friends? Yes, because the group is open to future mc:::mtJer, 
becau~e. there is a ~ublic purpose beyond friendship, namely, literary 
or rehg10us worship. Even if donors' motives are largely self-u· ue1res1ted 
organization may benefit other people and in that sense qualify as a 
purpose. 
!he e~pression "public purpose" is ambiguous in a helpful way. It 
to either (1) the purposes of givers, that is, their intentions and aims 
the ends actually promoted by gifts. Thus, philanthropy may occu~ 
d~nors try to promote what they believe to be a public good, even · 
fad to produce the intended results. Philanthropy also occurs when 
successfully promote a public purpose, even though their primary · 
were for other things, such as gaining personal recognition. 
To sum up, the definition of philanthropy as voluntary private 
public purposes contains several areas of vagueness. Nevertheless, it 
eral dear benefits for exploring the ethics of philanthropy. It avoids 
in preconceptions about good motives, admirable aims, desirable co11se1a1 
ces, and whether philanthropy can be a moral responsibility. All these 
ters are left for moral inquiry. Hence the definition is value-neutral 
"persuasive definitions" which build in controversial attitudes or ' 
about philanthropy. 22 
Persuasive definitions of philanthropy abound, sometimes P01tnttn1 
opposing directions. Here are eight persuasive definitions, each of 
some basis in ordinary language and may be useful in other contexts. 
they bias rather than facilitate moral inquiry, I note them in order 
them aside. 
(1) Lavish, large-scale giving, whether by very rich individuals 
foundations?3 (Philanthropy versus small gifts.) -This definition aids 
abets the stereotype of philanthropy as the proper domain of the 
Yet, about half the total dollar amounts of voluntary private giving for 
pu~poses comes from lower- and middle-income people. 24 Refusing to 
philanthropy as the province of the upper class is a first move toward 
ciating how it permeates all social classes. 
(2) Giving motivated by humanitarian love. (Philanthropy versus 
from nonhumanitarian motives.) -This definition has its roots in 
ogy: philanthropia is the Greek word for "love of humanity," altholllgtt.c: 
the Greeks "humanity'' meant free citizens and ruled out women 
barbarians. Nevertheless, the definition is misleading in several 'res:oe~cts. 
~uilds in one motive for philanthropy rather than leave the question 
ttves open for moral inquiry. Moreover, the motive suggests universal 
cern for humans, whereas much voluntary giving has more 
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as to help artists or scientists, Mormons or Baptists, local 
or nations, or to honor a famil~ name or a dec.eased relative. 
also disregards philanthropy a1med at preventmg cruelty to 
animals. . . . . 
optional giving. 25 . (Philanthropy ~ersus ~b.hgatory giVtng.) 
, it might be said 1n defense of thts definttton, ought to be 
f ·0y and generosity, not onerous duty. Yet many people engage 
J service motivated by a sense of responsibility, and that seems 
omtoa:ttllle with joyous giving. Surely these individuals are not con-
less morally flawed. In any case, rather than separate obligation 
~-ta~mthrc>DV at the outset, we should leave open for inquiry whether 
is sometimes morally required. 
...,. · -- for cultural purposes, such as the arts and sciences, rather 
giving to alleviate. suffering.~6 (Philanthropy as cultu~al pa-
r~ ,,rcr:>u:> compassionate chanty.) - Thts usage creates another mtslead-
:.;., .. .,,.. .. "'~n. Giving to science and education is sometimes motivated by 
to alleviate suffering by discovering long-term solutions to disease 
.lU"-·"J.UJ;:.· Most important, for the purposes of moral inquiry we need a 
that brings together cultural patronage and relief of suffering in 
invite questions about their relative priority. 
· · to prevent suffering by discovering long-term solutions, rather 
........... 9".., ... .,., alleviation of suffering.27 (Philanthropy as prevention versus 
-This definition seems to embody an attitude about the desirable 
in giving. Yet surely both short-term and long-term solutions to 
are important. Questions about relative priorities in allocating our 
should be left for investigation into particular situations rather than 
the outset by a definition. 
Giving money, rather than volunteering time and talent. (Philan-
versus volunteering.) -In fact, volunteered time and talent usually 
economic value, and offering money is one way to volunteer help. 
why I will use "philanthropy'' and "voluntary service" as rough syn-
while using "volunteering'' with its normal connotation of service 
hands-on participation. 28 
Good giving; giving which is wisely conceived, admirably motivated, 
>tneflc:ial in its consequences. ("True philanthropy'' versus flawed giv-
honorific usage has a place in inspirational writings and at cer-
pr~ising benefactors, but it is not useful in identifying an area of 
The nonprofit (independent, third) sector.29 (Philanthropy versus 
and business.) -It is true that much voluntary giving for public 
is directed toward such nonprofit organizations as museums, private 
churches, and shelters for battered women. Nevertheless, it is mis-
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leading to use the word "philanthropy'' to refer to the not-for-profit 
Some nonprofit organizations have no connection with voluntary 
some are established for tax purposes or other economic purposes 
than for serving public purposes. Conversely, many profit-making ' 
tions (such as for-profit hospitals) and government organizations 
public schools and libraries) depend heavily on volunteers and private 
tions. Philanthropy functions in all economic sectors. 
Practices and Virtues 
I defined philanthropy as acts of voluntary private giving for public 
poses.30 These acts, however, are rarely eccentric gestures; usually they 
in the course of participating in social practices. Here are just a few 
of philanthropic practices: giving by alumni to their alma maters, 
blood, sheltering the homeless, contributing to public radio and 
patronage of the arts, volunteering in community organizations 
hospitals, museums, police programs), participating in service groups 
wanis Club, Rotary Club, some sororities and fraternities), serving in 
munity safety programs, taking part in social protest movements, · · 
watchdog group to improve government, paying tithing, going on a 
assisting in wildlife preservation, whistle-blowing to warn the public of 
gers. 
These are social practices in the colloquial sense: patterns of 
engaged in by many people and continuing over time. They are also 
in Alasdair Macintyre's technical sense: activities that contribute to 
good when participants meet appropriate standards of excellence. 31 
thropy encompasses a large cluster of related practices, in the same 
the professions (medicine, teaching, engineering), sports (basketball, 
tennis), sciences (biology, physics, sociology), and the fine arts ( 
painting, sculpture, music), to cite some of Macintyre's examples of 
More fully, a practice is 
[I] any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
man activity [ 2] through which goods internal to that form of 
realized [3] in the course of trying to achieve those standards of 
which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
[ +] with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically ext,enCJLea;· 
I will clarify this definition as I apply each of its four parts to vuJLJ.<U ... U'~'" 
(I) Practices, including philanthropic practices, are "socially est::tbllSll 
in that they are made possible by structured societies and sustained by 
traditions. Practices remain coherent and identifiable even when they 
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'i"tliiffe:retlt forms over time and across cultures. Think of the vari-
c. . lassical Athens to today's professional athletics, or the 
trom c h h b . h. during the same time span. ~ . e.re .ave een as~oms 1ng 
als and functions of these actlvttles, m the techniques and go · h d · h "al l'*rnblctvelo.. in the organizations promotmg t em, an tn t e soc1 
e Philanthropy has an equally rich history of varied 
ser¥ . . . . al . 
purposes, styles, tactics, and tnstltutlon structunng. 
foundations have become essential to contemporary philan-
h did not exist a few centuries ago. By contrast, settlement t ey . · h 
e vitally important urban communtty centers pnor to t e ~ b di d of government programs, but they h~ve al~ ut sappeare . 
practice of donating blood became posstbledi~tth the emergifien~ale 
m
1
erucat technology, and someday 1t may sappear as art c1 
are developed. And there are both striking similarities and 
· medieval church-controlled charity (in the religious sense) and 
m . 1 
ove:rmme1at-1regulatea charity (in the legal sense). Increastng y, con-
v o~hilan1throptc practices are framed by a complex and ever-changing 
laws concerning tax deductions, rules for political donations, 
requirements for nonprofit corporations, and professional 
of development officers. 
·""''"'1!-i ............ .., is a "cooperative human activity'' in several respects. To 
it requires the active involvement of both givers and receivers. 
philanthropy is impossib~e if n~ on~ is willi~g t~ ~ffer help or 
calls for aid; it is equally tmposstble 1f no one IS wtllmg to accept 
there is more to be said. It is a misleading stereotype to regard 
as passive. Often they assert their needs and invite the ~articipat~on 
and donors. Think, for example, of a person seek1ng funding 
·puJn<l~ttJ.Lon by writing a grant proposal. Think, too, of a group vig-
to get a member of a minority elected as a volunteer member 
il'rnnn1t-\T board . 
. ~_., ....... .,,...., ...... ~givers and receivers are usually members of groups whose 
depends on cooperation. Donors might belong to organizations 
clubs, companies, or schools. Alternatively, they may be iden-
a group only by reference to their philanthropic goal: for example, 
to relief services for victims of the 1988 Armenia earthquake. 
large numbers of benefactors may be required in order to marshal 
re:souLrC(~S for tackling social problems. Beneficiaries, too, are typi-
of groups: residents of a country served by a privately funded 
l) t\.:m,en·carts in need of a kidney transplant, starving people in Bang-
intermediary groups and institutions play important roles in 
givers and receivers. Many of these organizations have complex 
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internal structures which enable them to exert social influence. 
nizations facilitate the activity of donors by collecting gifts and 
them to beneficiaries. Others aid recipients, such as universities and 
nity advisory groups which help grant writers to solicit rotlnctatllort 
Still others serve both constituencies, gathering and then n'"'"""'"n.-.~ 
for example, the United Way, CARE, Amnesty International, 
the Arts, Black United Fund, and various churches and syr1ag;ogue~•.• 
Finally, shifting to a value judgment, philanthropy tends to 
when it is a two-way interaction between donors and recipients 
each other as moral equals, rather than a one-way abandoning of 
from the rich to the poor. 33 The more both parties actively 
what is viewed as a shared enterprise, the more both benefit from 
exchanges and relationships. 
(2) The "internal goods" of a practice are those desirable 
moted by the practice in some singular (if not unique) manner 
defines the practice itself. 34 They include worthwhile experiences 
tionships, the exercise of valuable skills, and useful products and 
ated by practices. For example, each profession promotes 
services: medicine promotes health, law protects rights and serves 
education promotes learning, and engineering creates useful 
products. The fine arts promote several internal goods: artistic 
aesthetic enjoyment, and the creation of cultural artifacts and "".,,.....,....,,.~ 
Given their enormous diversity, philanthropic practices pr<>m•ote.,a 
variety of internal goods. They range from alleviating poverty to 
injured animals, from serving religious needs to improving gover~nrnetlt 
increasing literacy to promoting the arts. In general, philanthropic 
promote internal goods in numerous ways. 
Many philanthropic practices directly serve basic needs. Uttenmt 
to the homeless, a practice important in nearly all societies, contn 
survival needs, whether the shelter is temporary or permanent as in 
for Humanity's program of building homes. Working in a soup 
tains people who would otherwise be without food. Serving in a 
security program promotes public safety. And animal rescue and 
tion programs respond to the needs of nonhuman animals. 
Philanthropic practices may function as indirect or second-order 
promote the internal goods of another, primary practice. For 
alumni giving promotes learning, which is also the internal good 
tion. Again, patronage of the arts furthers the same internal 
arts themselves. And philanthropic contributions to improve 
promote justice, and serve the public welfare share these internal 
professionals working in government. 
Sometimes philanthropic practices are embedded in other, 
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directly promote their internal goods. Tithing, for example, 
part of some religions; it is both a religious and a philan-
When lawyers engage in pro bono publico work, volunteering 
ithout fee or at reduced fees, they are simultaneously engaged 
w law and philanthropy. And unpaid sheriff's deputies in po-
nn>er·arrts are engaged in both voluntary service and law enforce-
and most important for my purposes, philanthropy promotes ge-
goods of its own, distinct from those of a primary practice to 
be attached-generic in that they can be achieved through vir-
of philanthropy. In particular, successful philant~ro.py creates 
caring relationships between benefactors and benefioanes. These 
morally benefit giver and receiver alike, in ways I will explore 
this book. Philanthropy also fosters caring relationships among 
work together as donors or volunteers. And it can promote caring 
among recipients who share resources used for public endeavors, 
among members of a literacy education group which is sup-
foundation grant. 
contrasts internal goods with "external goods" -such as in-
and fame-which do not define the practice and which can 
by engaging in many different social practices. Individuals par-
in professions typically have some interest in both external and 
. They seek money and professional recognition (external 
well as the specific form of excellence or craftsmanship involved 
JJ.'-''"."'' ... (an internal good). The same is true of organizations con-
practices, such as those serving the professions (for example, the 
Association of University Professors), the sciences (the American 
Science), or the arts (the Actors Guild). Institutions also have 
rit Jtnt1erests in external, as well as internal, goods: ''They are involved 
money and other material goods; they are structured in terms 
status, and they distribute money, power and status as rewards. 
they do otherwise if they are to sustain not only themselves, but 
· of which they are the bearers. For no practices can survive 
of time unsustained by institutions. "35 
the same is true in philanthropy. Philanthropic organizations are 
interested in their own survival, growth, resources, and reputa-
to meet their philanthropic aims. Individuals, too, are typically 
in self-esteem, recognition and appreciation, and personal develop-
. · to their commitment to some public good. Within limits, 
mixture of purposes is morally acceptable, even desirable, inso-
:trengt:heJils the overall pursuit of good ends (as is argued in Chapter 
those limits, excessive concern for external goods, such as power 
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and prestige, distorts commitments to the internal goods of .., ........ ,,,rn 
ways that cause harm (of the kind discussed in Chapter 4). 
(3) "Standards of excellence" define better and worse ways of 
in a practice and thereby partly define the practice itself. The 
achievement in baseball, for example, define excellence in batting, 
and stealing bases, and partly define the nature and goals of the 
ilarly, philanthropic standards of excellence specify what it means 
well, and thereby partly define philanthropic practices. They 
help effectively, without waste and without making recipients feel 
They comprise all the norms, guidelines, virtues, and ideals that 
helping and caring relationships in philanthropy. 
(4) As numerous individuals and groups pursue excellence in 
"human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of 
and goods involved, are systematically extended." Talented 
example, have extended conceptions of technological possibilities as 
veloped automobiles, computers, space shuttles. Similarly, creative 
pists have widened the possibilities for caring within communities, 
for achieving an array of other public goods. To a remarkable 
history of philanthropy is the history of social innovation. 36 
nents of modern contemporary society began as philanthropic 
public education, community hospitals and libraries, welfare 
civil rights legislation, to name only a few. 
Now that Macintyre's definition of practices has been applied to 
thropy, consider an objection. I have suggested that philanthropy,· 
a set of social practices in a normative or value-laden sense which · 
the ideas of internal goods and standards of excellence. Yet I 
value-neutral definition of philanthropy as voluntary private giving 
purposes. Is this a contradiction, such that philanthropy is ree:arcted 
neutral and normative terms? 
In reply, we need to mark two distinctions. One is the d.1tJtere:111 
tween defining a concept and developing a normative conception of 
to which the concept applies. Defining how to operate a car is 
presenting a conception of safe driving is another. Similarly, 
anthropic acts is one thing; conceiving of them as parts of good-
practices is another. The definition of philanthropy remains value-net 
that it makes no assumptions about when philanthropy is good or 
contrast, the conception of philanthropic practices is normative in 
trays much philanthropy as aimed at internal goods. 
I am not claiming that all philanthropic activities are practices 
Intyre's sense. Racist and violent activities which assault the public 
not social practices, with internal goods. If racists and terrorists 
Giving with Care 19 
how they are mistaken. Moreover, defining practices n~~ :mply that all practices are good on balance. A phil-
. ht serve an internal good and yet also promote unde-
mtg · · · 1 d · · h 
n a religious mtsston 1s a value- a en practice m t at '''~"''t'Ullfltl 0 . h 
to,waru some aspect of the public ~o?d, but we mig t see more 
. particular forms of proselyttzmg. dis~nction is between individual acts and the general practices 
definition of philanthropy focused on acts, whereas the 
''""~, ....... .,.u-.n applies to philanthropic practices as a whole. We can 
as falling under a practi~e wi~hout evaluating t~e act. To use 
from medicine, we can. Identtfy a_ heart operat1?n as a phy-
occurs within a practtce whose mternal good 1s health, and 
t immoral because its ineptness killed the patient. Similarly, 
acacts as falling under philanthropic practices without implying 
We can say, for example, that giving cash to a mendicant 
practice of alms giving, whose internal good is to meet basic 
;ad·vai1tta~~ea individuals. At the same time, we can criticize the 
001,0 pna1te if it is likely to be used for drugs and where a more 
would have been a donation to a hunger organization which 
money's proper use. 
lirur1ltllOn of philanthropy, then, remains value-neutral even though 
Ml:>et:!:tmmnt,g to develop a normative conception of desirable forms 
The next step is to extend that conception by relating phil-
ot~tcttces to the virtues. 
imply desirable patterns of action, but also much more. Most of 
valuable patterns of emotions, attitudes, desires, utterances, rea-
relationships. For example, kindness is sensitive concern for the 
of others as manifested in actions, words, reasoning, and feelings. 
is shown by avoiding cheating and stealing, motivated by 
... , ..... L..,., ....... • it is also shown by having respect for truth and evidence, 
shoddy thinking, and pride in communicating clearly. Virtues 
merit badges. They are valuable ways of relating to people, 
communities. As such, they promote the good of both our-
others. 
identifies three ways in which the virtues promote internal 
they enable participants in practices to meet appropriate stan-
ex~::ellen<:e so as to achieve internal goods. Macintyre makes this 
of the definition of virtues: "a virtue is an acquired human qual-
)SS~:ssi'on and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those 
are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively pre-
achieving any such goods."37 Standards of excellence differ 
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greatly among practices, which is not surprising since they partly 
dividual practices, but the virtues are important in all practices, 
somewhat different ways depending on the context. Such virtues 
and respect for people, for example, promote excellence in pr<)te:ss1c 
enting, playing sports-and philanthropy. 
Some virtues motivate people to participate in philanthropy; for 
compassionateness, generosity, loyalty, and a sense of justice. 
enable us to give effectively. Prudence and practical wisdom help 
wasting resources by inquiring carefully into which organizations 
of support. Kindness and humility enable us to avoid snobbery 
scending pity toward recipients. Courage and persistence are vital 
for volunteers seeking social reform. Honesty and integrity enable 
to preserve public trust in organizations. And justice and tat'rnc~ss, 
corruption in organizations. As these examples suggest, the 
the virtues in philanthropy reflects the complexity of moral life. 
Second, the virtues foster unity of character. Conflict and 
permeate our lives. Some conflicts derive from threats to those 
commitments which provide personal continuity and integrity. 
of self-discipline and self-knowledge enable us to confront ternpt:afi4 
weakness; courage enables us to meet danger; perseverence helps 
with discouragement. Other conflicts derive from tensions within 
commitments. The virtues promote balance and integration among 
ious practices and relationships we commit ourselves to at any · 
For example, prudence and conscientiousness help us manage the 
demands of family, friends, education, work, political involvement, 
anthropic commitments. In general, the virtues provide guidance 
ence in the ongoing "narrative quest'' (endeavor over time) to · 
to live well. 38 
Third, the virtues sustain moral traditions and communities. 39 
tradition is a valuable way of living which maintains an identifiable 
through time. Traditions are embedded in communities, including 
nities unified by geography, history, economics, religion, and · 
common practices. By permeating communities, virtues sustain 
through many generations. 
Each of these roles for the virtues is important in un.derstan(:ll,.l 
moral status of philanthropy. Chapter 3 explores how virtues 
lence in philanthropic practices. Chapter 6 explores how the 
personal unity during the ongoing search for a fulfilling life. "-'U ... .., .. ,., .. 
cusses the harms done to individuals and communities in the 
important virtues. And the following section in this chapter says 
the role of the virtues in sustaining communities. Before Dr<)ceedl.ng; 
Giving with Care 21 
dditional ways in which the virtues enter into note some a . 
the three Macintyre discu~ses. . . . 
f h · rtues is to functiOn as tdeals for the kmd of m-role o t e vt 'al 'd al 
· to become Each virtue represents a partt 1 e asptre · . . . 
1 S Of virtues define composite tdeals. A composite c~= . 
· ht be honesty and commitment to excellence combmed 
rrug · f · 'd toward others. In this way, ideals of v1rtue unction as gu1 es 
commitments, and habit formation, even when they are not 
· guide moral education. Of course, we also use simple vtrtues , 
in teaching morality: Be hones~, Don t steal, Retur~ favors 
the point of citing these rules 1s largely to convey virtuous 
and ways of relating to other pe~ple. " . 
Edmund L. Pincoffs points out, the virtues provide grounds 
or for avoidance of persons," and shape the nuances of rel~­
we tend to seek out friendly and kind people and to avmd 
people, and our r~lationships. with tr~st~o.rthy individuals 
from those with unrehable and dishonest mdiv1duals. 
as ideals, virtues guide organizations, as ':ell as individual~Y 
including philanthropic ones, can be sa1d to ac~, a~summg 
which authorize individuals to act for the organ1zat1on as a 
acts may or may not reflect patterns of ~o~ial responsi~ility, 
compassion, prudence, efficiency, collegtaltty, and fidehty to 
mission. 
distinction: If the virtues include all desirable traits of indi-
r<iinstltUltiOns, then we should differentiate between moral and non-
42 Moral virtues such as honesty, compassionateness, and 
direct concern for the interests of others (in addition to 
Other categories of virtue include aesthetic excellence (graceful-
' intellectual excellence (intelligence, creativity, commitment to 
physical excellence (vigor, athletic skill), and religious sensitivity 
the sacred). In what follows, "virtue" will refer to moral virtues, 
the context indicates otherwise. 
this distinction, we should appreciate that nonmoral vir-
on moral significance in certain circumstances. As will become 
next chapter, the nonmoral virtues of reverence for the sacred, 
of beauty, and commitment to excellence in the professions all 
significance when they motivate morally desirable forms of phi-
M<)re~ovc::r, just as moral and nontnoral virtues interact in philan-
do moral and nonmoral purposes. Even when a philanthropic 
moral per se, giving may have moral significance. Giving to 
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the arts, humanities, and sciences has dear moral implications b h. 
fi . · h · , Ot ttng artists, umantsts, and scientists and in promoting the 
everyone affected by their achievements. 
Caring within Communities 
Between 194-0 and 194-4-, the 3,500 French villagers at Le 
cued 6,ooo Jews, most of them children, by sheltering them from 
and smuggling many to Switzerland. They took enormous risks. 
they gained the indulgence of a sympathetic Nazi officer, the 
could have been massacred if even one citizen betrayed their 
did. 
T~e community at Le Chambon was unified by ties of religion 
phy, history, and local traditions. Most villagers were descendants of 
~uenots, a Protestant minority persecuted in Catholic France 
sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The community was also united 
of benevolence, courage, perseverence, and integrity. As Philip 
their "caring had to do in part with Saint John's commandment to 
another, but it also had to do with stubbornness, if you will, 
refusal to abjure . . . [their] commitment'' to sheltering people 
they shared through empathy and with compassion. 43 
Many of the villagers did not regard their actions as heroic or 
ceptionally virtuous. In their eyes they were simply responding to 
of others: "How can you call us 'good'? We were doing what had to 
Who else could help them? And what has all this to do with 
Things had to be done, that's all, and we happened to be there to 
You must understand that it was the most natural thing in the 
these people.'~ Whether or not they were religious, members of 
mu?ity acknowledged a sense of responsibility to help strangers 
their hves. But the felt responsibility was not experienced as an 
den. It was a spontaneous and natural response to need, and as 
adigm of virtue. 
. Andre Trocme was the local pastor who led the villagers' 
ststance to the Nazis. During the years before the war, Trocme 
lated an ethic of service centered on a distinction between giving 
merely giving things. Hallie explains: 
[W]hen you give somebody a thing without giving yourself, you 
both parties by making the receiver utterly passive and by making 
a benefactor standing there to receive thanks-and even so1metm1es 
ence-as repayment. But when you give yourself, nobody is 
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are elevated by a shared joy. What you give creates new, 
instead of arrogance on the one hand and passivity on the 
between giving oneself and merely giving things is not 
-~""'"m"" •• ., volunteering time and donating money; the villagers 
in both ways. Instead, it is the distinction between giving 
impersonally. However good its consequences, imper-
'lralteilS relationships based on moral equality. By contrast, giv-
good will and good judgment-enables us to bring our 
relationships based on a sense of shared humanity. 
at Chambon expressed existing ties of community and also 
..:•.M.nntnr by creating new caring relationships. A pre-existing 
•.w.n n1ru became focused in doing something of moral conse-
Existing community organizations were transformed in or-
fleeing for their lives, as well as to protect the villagers. 
for example, together with some thirteen Bible study 
tralns:torme:d into a communications network which enabled the 
respond quickly to Nazi raids. 
......... ,lUlU''-'"' illustrates, philanthropic caring within communities 
relationships that strengthen, enlarge, and partly define corn-
y what is meant by "caring'' and "community''? 
can refer to several things: an attitude, the specific virtue of 
a more generic virtue of moral concern manifested in all the 
" ............ , ....... , .. u· • ..,u based on mutual moral concern. After briefly distin-
I will rely on context to indicate which is meant. 
caring is positive regard for the good of someone or 
care "about'' persons (or animals) is to desire their well-being 
rather than solely for benefits to us. To care "for'' individuals 
their well-being or to be prepared to. Their well-being 
reason to act on their behalf, without having to look further 
to us. 
:,.;n:amoonna:'ts remind us, caring is a sympathetic response to the 
It implies understanding their situation, desires, and beliefs. 
a· readiness to help if needed. It is shown in a variety of emo-
compassion, solicitude, fear for people who are in danger, 
are in trouble, hope for success in their endeavors, delight 
. .,n,.,. .... ..-l joy when they return our love, and remorse when we 
needed help. And it is shown in beneficent acts that is acts 
the desire to help and which actually succeed i~ helpin~ oth-
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Caring, then, is more than conduct, even though conduct 
decisive indicator. Caring involves sensitivity, understanding, 
good judgment-aspects of character that are not reducible to 
ple rules of Do and Do Not. All aspects of the personality are 
connecting our lives with others. That is why giving with 
oneself. 
As the specific virtue of benevolence, caring is the virtue of 
the attitude of caring in morally desirable ways. It implies 
needs and desires of others, showing compassion for their 
lighting in their good fortune, being kind and generous. In a 
form, it is a general attitude of active good will toward &&-·•U«lu 
focused form, it is directed toward particular individuals or 
As a generic virtue, caring is moral concern for persons 
This is the thematic sense used in the title of this book and 
present chapter. Beyond just wishing others well, it is a at·s :positio1 
when one can, together with a tendency to help effectively. 
means giving in a concerned and careful manner, with good will 
ligence. As such, it is an umbrella virtue which alludes to the full 
of philanthropic virtues explored in Chapter 2. 
Caring relationships are between two or more people who 
generic sense) for each other. Caring is not always reciprocated with 
parity. Parents caring for their newborn baby constitute one 
caring relationship, even though of necessity it is an unequal 
Normally, however, the caring person hopes that the caring will 
be reciprocated, even when the hope is not fulfilled: regrettably, a 
turns a cold eye toward a benefactor; tragically, an infant dies 
return its parents' love. 
Can philanthropy involve caring relationships? Isn't it more a 
helping strangers based on one-way positive attitudes, by contrast 
and friendships where talk of relationships is straightforward? 
To begin with, much philanthropy is connected with family, 
other face-to-face interactions. Much philanthropy is engaged in 
family member, living or dead, or offered on behalf of an 
Moreover, many philanthropic interactions in local communities 
extension of family relationships; for example, participating in 
Teachers Association, church groups, and amateur sports. In 
ways, philanthropy provides ways to express in a public forum 
relationships rooted in private life. 
In addition, philanthropy creates new personal relationships. 
hand, there are new friendships to be made with people we help. 
Anena, who for years has served meals to homeless people at a 
park near my college, makes a point of seeking friendship with 
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. · g 1· n a Big Brother or Big Sister program, volun-tn servm 
arents and siblings. On the other hand, volunteers 
of ~ammon causes tend to develop ties of friendship. 
inspiration) to hundreds of students who over the years 
to help with her w~rk. . . 
h direct interactions are not posstble, prospects for m-
w en diminish. That may create problems. The increas-
ture of large organizations and mass movements in na . d c 
1 Where is a cause for genuine concern. Umte Way, tor e se , . . . .r~snOJtlctc:o by allowing donors to spe~tfy ~hiCh_ prog~ams their 
thereby strengthening personal tdenttficanon wtth causes. 
when we do not know beneficiaries or other contributors, 
our lives in caring ways with others. Why do we con-
political party or social ca_use? B~cause. we share its 
other individuals, givers and receivers al1ke, With whom we 
'buting to our country, state, or city, we sustain ties to 
about even though we do not know them personally. 
givi;g to strangers with whom ~e have no particul~r .affilia-
a caring relationship when we ma1l a check to help VICtims of 
or tornado? There is a relationship of shared humanity 
that our efforts will be appreciated, and in that sense our 
In giving, we connect our lives with theirs in ways 
affirm human kinship. A gift shows they matter to us. Our 
for strangers is limited, but it exists and it is important. It 
·vated, and one way is through philanthropy. 
to strangers have an intimacy all their own. Donations of 
with symbolic meaning. 48 So do gifts of body organs. At the 
scope of these gifts-their range of possible recipients-is 
donor does not know who will receive the blood, or even 
be sold or discarded before it can be used. Even when the 
however, there is a symbolic relationship: donors hope their 
and they naturally hope the gift will be appreciated; they also 
· with people in need of life-saving resources. 
organs, and emergency funds have strong symbolic mean-
because they are offered to strangers. They express our desire 
because they are people, rather than because they stand in 
relationship to us. This meaning is not sentimental fluff; it is 
the gifts in which it is embedded. 
· caring is not always aimed directly at persons. The imme-
may be an ideal, cause, practice, organization, animals, or the 
There is still concern for the well-being of what we care about, 
of well-being differs according to the object. The well-being 
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of persons is self-fulfillment. The well-being of animals is their 
in the life appropriate to them. The well-being of a community 
stitution, or practice is its continuance and improvement. And th~ 
of ideals means their widespread acceptance and implementation. 
Even in these cases, caring relationships with persons are often 
involved. To care for a cause or an organization typically implies 
people affected by them. A gift to a hospital or a medical research 
is more than impersonal support to promote scientific knnur••"'ri"·~ 
expression of concern for people who will benefit from those 
In addition, there are the relationships among individuals who 
mitment to practices and institutions. Commitments to music or 
preservation, for example, link people together in shared endeavors 
tual care. There are also relationships, however formal, with people 
resent organizations and groups. Even an acknowledgment 
representative of an organization to which we mailed a donation 
mum form of reciprocity, which explains why its absence nr,.,.....,,... .. ;:. 
ment. 
Turn now to the idea of community, which is a value-laden 
community is any group of people joined by shared caring, both 
caring in which they care about the well-being of members of the 
confluent caring in which they participate together in practices on 
of caring for the same activities, goals, or ideals.49 For example, 
communities are identified by confluent commitments to relllgtcms 14 
well as by reciprocal caring among church members. Professional 
ties unite people with shared goals and also evoke reciprocal 
colleagues. Neighborhood communities combine shared interests 
terest in neighborhood safety and beauty) with mutual concern 
being of the members. Many philanthropic organizations are 
communities which serve wider communities. Widest of all is 
community'' that includes all morally concerned humans, past, 
future. Next in scope is the "global community'' comprising all 
ently alive. Then come societies and the smaller communities they 
intimate small groups (families, a circle of friends), more ·· r .............. .,,,...",<~ 
scale structures (such as governments), and a variety of u· 1te1~mc!dl~tt< 
serving special needs. Philanthropic organizations generally tur1ct1on 
mediate or "mediating groups" which link individuals and families 
social structures. 50 
Communities, including philanthropic ones, provide a variety of 
for fostering virtues. Churches, scouts, amateur athletics, eduGILtlon~ 
ties, and service organizations are examples of groups that help in 
virtues and promoting caring relationships which sustain coJDfl1l1fllt1~ 
viously not all communities are equally effective in this regard, 
all are good overall. 51 Fully desirable communities-the ones in 
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c. 11 developed in individuals and organizations-
successlu Y 
communities generate extensive networks of recip-
tesirau.l'-' Typically, individuals have _some awareness t~at 
· This makes it rational to g1ve to strangers w1th 
canng. 
· w1·u be reciprocated even when we are unable to carmg 
it is. c. · 1 
d · able communities are just, in that they do not un1a1r y es1r · b h. 
set eligibility requirements that restnct mem ers tp, 
may · · Th · all cannot be based on preJudice. ey recogntze peo-
LUJ .... r~i·g·~~hts to participate in and benefit from th1~ ~alider s<:>ci~ty unity is embedded. With respect to po ttlc soctettes, c;:: economic inequalities unless the minimal needs of all 
t'dc:!su~able community is characterized by widespread appreciation 
. That means valuing its practices, institutions, traditions, 
It implies cherishing the communi_t~'~ ~eritage, hopi?g for 
desiring to promote its present poss1b1httes. These att1tudes 
· but they must be widespread. 
desirable communities there are numerous valuable activities 
lestrallle ones. The activities may be political, economic, profes-
lnn::u--or philanthropic, as in giving together. Cooperation, to-
l':a'wa1reness of the importance of that cooperation, is essential. 
is widespread faith and trust in the prospects for the com-
evoke full participation of community members. Without 
of social cooperation are at risk. 53 In particular, without trust 
philanthropic giving loses its hope and its point. At the same 
~'I>hiJlanthropl·c giving is value-centered and virtue-guided, it is a 
for strengthening social trust. 54 
is extensive rational public discourse and shared reflection 
and activities of a group. Moral discourse and reasoning are 
Philanthropic organizations improve their chances of 
the public good insofar as they maintain open dialogue with 
· and the public. Insofar as they contribute to public dis-
moral issues, they strengthen the conceptual framework essential 
caring within communities. A vocabulary of the virtues is a 
that framework. 
,,......... ................. ., .... has eroded in American society, in the view of Robert 
co-authors of the sociology-based study Habits of the Heart. 
was borrowed from a phrase used by Alexis de Tocqueville 
mental and moral dispositions which unify a society. One such 
heart, observed by Tocqueville during his famous visit to the 
in 1831, is the tendency to form and participate in voluntary 
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organizations. According to Tocqueville, this tendency counterbalances the 
danger of excessive individualism in isolating people from the wider commu-
nity. According to Bellah, this danger threatens the very community which 
makes individual freedom possible. 
Bellah occasionally portrays Americans as behaving selfishly: "We have 
put our own good, as individuals, as groups, as a nation, ahead of the com-
mon good. "55 His main thesis, however, is that Americans suffer from a kind 
of conceptual selfishness: "If there are vast numbers of a selfish, narcissistic 
'me generation' in America, we did not find them, but we certainly did find 
that the language of individualism, the primary American language of self-
understanding, limits the ways in which people think."56 During their study 
of some two hundred individuals, Bellah and his colleagues repeatedly heard 
descriptions of family, work, and community involvement cast in self-cen-
tered terms. Americans' primary language in thinking about values is the 
language of personal success through material rewards ("utilitarian individu-
alism"), together with personal pleasures through satisfying preferences ("ex-
pressive individualism"). Even in portraying their moral commitments, they 
emphasized individual choices rather than responsibility. Their conceptual 
world centers in "lifestyle enclaves" of private consumption rather than in 
public community. 
Bellah urges us to rethink individualism. Its valuable aspects, especially 
personal initiative, self-reliance, and respect for individual dignity and free-
dom, should be retained. Personal initiative, however, needs to be understood 
as exercised in and through community. That understanding can be fostered 
by returning to two traditions deeply embedded in American culture. One 
is the republican tradition of active democratic citizenship. The other is the 
biblical tradition which has kept alive the ideal of a compassionate and just 
society. Reclaiming the moral languages of these two traditions will enable 
us to reconceive individualism as a product of communities and in turn be 
fulfilled by giving back to communities. 
I have some sympathy for Bellah's recommendations (even though the 
moral language he proposes is not altogether dear). At the same time, given 
our increasingly pluralistic culture, it would be parochial to recommend a 
biblical emphasis to the neglect of Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist scriptures 
and the rich literature of nonsectarian humanism. If we are to communicate 
across religious boundaries, as well as reconcile individualism and commu-
nity, we need to emphasize what is common or at least overlapping among 
our moral languages, and do so within a pluralistic world view which is 
tolerant of alternative religious and moral perspectives. A first step in that 
direction is to become more fully acquainted with the language of the vir-
tues. 
2 
Virtues in Giving 
Actions expressing virtue are noble, and aim at what is noble. Hence the 
generous person ... will aim at what is noble in ?is giving and will giv~ 
correctly; for he will give to the right people, the nght amounts, at the nght 
time, and all the other things that are implied by correct giving. He will do 
this, moreover, with pleasure or [at any rate] without pain .... 
-Aristotle 
[V]irtue is the attempt to pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the 
world as it really is. 
-Iris Murdoch 
ARISTOTLE coNCEIVED OF the virtues as tendencies to hit the mean, that is, the reasonable middle ground between the vices of too much (excess) 
and too little (deficiency). He classified the virtues according to the kinds of 
emotions, desires, and actions they govern. Thus, courage is the mean be-
tween cowardice and foolhardiness when confronting danger and experienc-
ing fear; temperance is the mean between overindulgence and apathy in 
satisfying the appetites; pride is the mean between vanity and a sense of 
inferiority when making self-appraisals or feeling self-esteem. According to 
Aristotle, there are two virtues in giving wealth, depending on one's eco-
nomic resources. Eleutheriotes, sometimes translated as "liberality," is the vir-
tue of openhanded givers who have modest resources. Megaloprepeia, 
translated as "magnificence," is the corresponding virtue of wealthy individu-
als who are able to make lavish gifts. For liberality the extremes are wasteful-
ness and stinginess, whereas for magnificence the extremes are vainglory and 
pettiness. 
Liberality and magnificence are usually understood as two dimensions of 
the virtue of generosity. Yet the word "generosity'' is not a perfect translation 
of Aristotle's terms. In its ordinary sense, "generosity'' means benevolent giv-
ing beyond what is required or customary. By contrast, Aristotle had in mind 
the far more robust idea of correct giving, whether on modest or on lavish 
scales. He meant voluntary giving to worthy recipients, in fitting amounts, 
on suitable occasions, for apt reasons, with appropriate attitudes and emo-
